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Contents

Regular Articles

Darrell Duffie, Semyon Malamud, and Gustavo Manso. Information percolation in segmented markets	1
Francesco De Sinopoli, Claudia Meroni, and Carlos Pimienta. Strategic stability in Poisson games	46
Roger B. Myerson. Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents	74
Maria Goltsman and Gregory Pavlov. Communication in Cournot oligopoly	152
Richard McLean, Ichiro Obara, and Andrew Postlewaite. Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring	191
Laurence Ales, Pricila Maziero, and Pierre Yared. A theory of political and economic cycles	224
Belén Jerez. Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: A general equilibrium approach	252
David Dillenberger, Juan Sebastián Lleras, Philipp Sadowski, and Norio Takeoka. A theory of subjective learning	287
Edoardo Gallo. Social learning by chit-chat	313
Man-Wah Cheung. Pairwise comparison dynamics for games with continuous strategy space	344
Bill Dupor and M. Saif Mehkari. The analytics of technology news shocks	392

Continued on inside back cover

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Itai Sher and Kyoo il Kim. Identifying combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand	428
Gadi Barlevy. A leverage-based model of speculative bubbles	459
Jacob K. Goeree and Yuanchuan Lien. An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction	506
Braz Camargo and Benjamin Lester. Trading dynamics in decentralized markets with adverse selection	534
Jan Heufer. Nonparametric comparative revealed risk aversion	569
Reto Foellmi, Tobias Wuergler, and Josef Zweimüller. The macroeconomics of Model T	617
Lars Ehlers, Isa E. Hafalir, M. Bumin Yenmez, and Muhammed A. Yildirim. School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds	648
Notes	
Yuan Ju, Youngsub Chun, and René van den Brink. Auctioning and selling positions: A non-cooperative approach to queuing conflicts	33
Ju Hu. Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning	64
Debasis Mishra, Anup Pramanik, and Souvik Roy. Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces	103
Paolo G. Piacquadio. Intergenerational egalitarianism	117
Yaron Azrieli and Eran Shmaya. Rental harmony with roommates	128
Ziv Hellman. A game with no Bayesian approximate equilibria	138
Lei Qiao and Haomiao Yu. On the space of players in idealized limit games	177
Carlos Oyarzun. A note on absolutely expedient learning rules	213
Hiroki Nishimura and Efe A. Ok. Non-existence of continuous choice <i>functions</i> ...	376
Ron Siegel. Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations	684
Zhenyu Cui. Comment on “Modeling non-monotone risk aversion using SAHARA utility functions” [J. Econ. Theory 146 (2011) 2075–2092]	703